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In quantum key distribution (QKD), the bit error rate is used to estimate the information leakage
and hence determines the amount of privacy amplification — making the final key private by short-
ening the key. In general, there exists a threshold of the error rate for each scheme, above which
no secure key can be generated. This threshold puts a restriction on the environment noises. For
example, a widely used QKD protocol — BB84 — cannot tolerate error rates beyond 25%. A new
protocol, round-robin differential phase shifted (RRDPS) QKD, essentially removes this restriction
and can in principle tolerate more environment disturbance. Here, we propose and experimentally
demonstrate a passive RRDPS QKD scheme. In particular, our 500 MHz passive RRDPS QKD
system is able to generate a secure key over 50 km with a bit error rate as high as 29%. This scheme
should find its applications in noisy environment conditions.
The uncertainty principle guarantees that whenever an
eavesdropper, Eve wants to learn key information in the
quantum channel, she would inevitably introduce distur-
bances, which could be detected by the two authorized
parties, Alice and Bob. In reality, the quantum channel
may suffer from environment disturbance, which could
cause errors and even more vitally conceal Eve’s attack.
The amount of leaked key information, which is quanti-
fied by a phase error ep, can be inferred from the channel
disturbance, which is quantified by a bit error eb. The
final key rate is given by [1],
R ≥ 1−H(eb)−H(ep), (1)
where H(e) = −e log e − (1 − e) log(1 − e) is the binary
Shannon entropy function. The bit error can be directly
computed from the experimental data, whereas the phase
error needs to be estimated or bounded. In the BB84 pro-
tocol with strong symmetries, one can show that ep = eb
in the long key length limit. In other protocols, normally
there is a relation between the two error rates. In the
end, when the error rate eb goes beyond some threshold
level, no secure key can be generated. For example, with
the Shor-Preskill security proof [1, 2], the BB84 protocol
can maximally tolerate 11% error rate. For any security
analysis, a simple intercept-and-resend attack [3] shows
that the BB84 protocol cannot tolerate more than 25%
error rate. This threshold puts a stringent requirement
on the system environment, which makes some practical
implementations challenging.
Recently, Sasaki et al. proposed a round-robin differen-
tial phase-shift (RRDPS) QKD protocol [4]. The sender
Alice encodes a random phase, chosen from {0, pi}, on
each of L pulses, with an average photon number of
µ. Upon receiving the L-pulse block, the receiver Bob
implements a single-photon interference with an Mach-
Zehnder interferometer (MZI), as shown in Fig. 1a. The
key point is that Bob can randomly adjust the length
difference of the two arms of the MZI. After obtaining a
detection click, Bob first identifies which two pulses in-
terfere and then announces the corresponding indices i, j
to Alice. Alice can derive the relative phase between the
two pulses as the raw key, and Bob can record the raw
key from the measurement results. The phase error rate
ep depends only on the number of photons in the L-pulse
signal and L, not the bit error rate eb. By setting a large
enough L, the phase error rate tends to 0 and hence the
scheme can tolerate up to 50% bit error rate according
to Eq. (1).
In the protocol, Bob needs to randomly adjust the
length difference between the two arms of the MZI, from
1 to L − 1 pulse periods. Based on the current tech-
nology, however, it is challenging to quickly change the
length difference of the two arms in an MZI. The main
adjust-delay method is to utilize optical switches, which
cannot provide both high speed and low insertion loss
simultaneously.
In this Letter, we propose an alternative scheme that
passively chooses two pulses to interfere with the same bit
error tolerability. When Bob receives a block from Alice,
he prepares a local L-pulse reference in plain phases, i.e.,
all phases are encoded at phase 0. This L-pulse reference
interferes with the L-pulse signal sent by Alice on a beam
splitter, as shown in Fig. 1c. For each block, Bob records
the status of his two detectors with timestamps, i and j.
If Bob’s reference is in phase with Alice’s signal, the
whole setup is essentially a huge MZI. Any detection sig-
nal at time slot i will tell the phase difference between
i and the phase reference. Then the encoding bit value
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FIG. 1. (a) Original RRDPS scheme [4]. VDL stands for
variable delay line. Bob splits the received signals into two
paths and applies a variable delay r to one of the paths. (b)
Equivalent model. Bob obtains a click at position i, generates
two random numbers r ∈ {1, · · · , L − 1} and b ∈ {0, 1} to
obtain j = i + (−1)br, and publicly announces i and j to
Alice. (c) Passive RRDPS scheme. Bob uses a local laser to
generate an L-pulse reference, which interferes with Alice’s
L-pulse signal. Bob then records the coincidence clicks.
can be revealed to Bob. Here, Bob requires a phase refer-
ence from Alice, which may require complicate frequency
comb technology [5].
The phase reference is not necessary requirement for
our scheme though. If Bob’s phase reference is random
comparing to Alice’s signal, the interference is no longer
a Mach-Zehnder type but a Hong-Ou-Mandel type [6].
Let us consider a simple case when both Alice and Bob
each has exactly one photon in their L-pulse trains. The
states of Alice and Bob can be represented by
1√
L
L∑
i=1
(−1)sia†i |0〉,
1√
L
L∑
i=1
b†i |0〉 (2)
respectively, where si ∈ {0, 1} designates the phase of Al-
ice’s i-th pulse. Since there are two photons in a block,
one from Alice and one from Bob, Bob would obtain
at most two detection clicks. He post-selects to choose
the block where there are exactly two detections and an-
nounces their positions i and j (if i = j, the detection
result is discarded). The raw key is the relative phase
between these two pulses in the L-pulse signal. Alice can
derive this phase difference from her record.
After the interference and Bob’s post-selection, the
quantum state at the two detectors becomes one of
(1− (−1)si+sj )d†i c†j |0〉, (1− (−1)si+sj )c†id†j |0〉,
(1 + (−1)si+sj )c†i c†j |0〉, (1 + (−1)si+sj )d†id†j |0〉,
(3)
FIG. 2. Experiment setup. ATT: attenuator; IM: intensity
modulator; BS: polarization maintaining beam splitter; PM:
phase modulator; Delay: optical adjustable delay line; PC:
polarization controller; PBS: polarization beam splitter (sin-
gle mode to polarization maintaining); Det: detector. The
attenuation on Bob’s side is realized by a polarization con-
troller and a polarization beam splitter.
where c†i and d
†
i are the creation operators at the two
detectors respectively, as shown in Fig. 1c. This means if
Alice’s pulses i and j have the same phase, i.e., si = sj ,
the two clicks should be triggered by the same detec-
tor. While if Alice’s pulses i and j have different phases,
the two clicks should be triggered by different detectors.
Thus Bob can derive the relative phase by comparing the
measurement results of the i-th and j-th pulses.
For the security analysis, we show that in the single
photon case, our protocol is equivalent to an intermedi-
ate model shown in Fig. 1b [4], which is then equivalent
to the RRDPS protocol. Thus the phase error ep is also
bounded by 1/(L − 1) as in RRDPS. Bob post-selects
the block where two clicks happen at i and j, but he
cannot distinguish whether the photon causing the click
belongs to the signal (Alice) or to the reference (Bob).
Suppose Bob’s photon is at i; the other case is similar.
Since the L-pulse reference of Bob has a symmetry among
all pulses, the L − 1 possible positions of Bob’s photon
i (excluding the position of Alice’s photon, j) have the
same weight. Bob has passively chosen a random shift
r = j − i between the clicks i and j, which is equivalent
to the active shift in the raw model, as shown in Fig. 1a.
We give a strict proof of this equivalence in the Supple-
mental Material, by showing that for any single photon
input to Bob, the output, which is the distribution of
the detection event (i, j), remains the same for both our
protocol and the raw model.
In practice, a single-photon state source is often re-
placed by a weak laser pulse, which can be described
3by a coherent state. Alice generates a coherent state
pulse, randomizes its phase, and divides it into a series
of weaker coherent state pulses using, say, beam split-
ters. Alice can also generate the pulse train directly, say
by modulating a continuous-wave laser, with the same
phase, which we called overall phase. This state prepa-
ration is the same for Bob. When the overall phase is
randomized, it is shown that the state of the whole pulse
train can be described by a statistical mixture of Fock
states, whose photon number follows a Poisson distribu-
tion [7]. Similar to the single-photon case, Alice’s key
information is encoded into the relative phases between
pulses.
In this coherent-state scenario, it is possible to have
multi-photon components in both Alice and Bob’s re-
spective pulse trains, which will invariably alter Bob’s
post processing strategy. If Bob gets two or more detec-
tor clicks in a block, he randomly chooses two timestamps
i and j of detector clicks and announces them. Other-
wise, he discards the result. In this way, Bob can figure
out the phase difference between i and j as in the single
photon protocol. By dividing into cases, one can bound
ep for the coherent-state protocol. Detailed analysis can
be found in Supplemental Material.
Meanwhile, the multi-photon components may cause
a large inherent bit error rate. Imagine the case where
Alice sends nothing (or photons are lost in the channel)
and Bob sends 2 photons, it might result in a false con-
clusive detection event. The bit error rate in this case is
clearly 50%. Since the probability of two single photons
from each side (which does not have any inherent error)
is the same as the probability of multi-photon from one
arm and nothing from the other, the total inherent bit
error rate will be 25%.
Our passive RRDPS scheme has three possible types of
implementations: single-photon case, phase-locked weak
coherent state, phase-randomized weak coherent sate.
The third case is the most practical, which does not needs
any fancy phase-locking technology, single photon source
or high-speed optical switches. We then provide a proof-
of-principle experiment demonstration for the third case.
The experiment setup is shown in Fig. 2. On Alice’s
side, a tunable extra cavity diode laser with a central
wavelength of 1550.14 nm and a line-width of 50 kHz is
modulated into a pulse train with a repetition frequency
500 MHz. A beam splitter (BS) is used to separate the
pulse train into two beams, one is for Alice’s encoding
and the other one is sent to Bob as a reference. Alice
encodes random {0, pi} phase into each individual pulse
of the pulse train with a 10 GHz modulator, driven by
a pulse pattern generator. The pulse pattern generator’s
random signal is generated beforehand by a quantum ran-
dom number generator. Before sending the pulse train to
the channel, Alice attenuates the average photon number
per pulse into 0.004. The signal light goes through the
channel of a fiber spool to Bob.
On Bob’s side, he first attenuates his reference pulse
intensity into an average photon number µ = 0.004 per
pulse, and then interferes with the reference pulse on a
BS. Before the BS, a tunable fiber delay line and some
fixed fiber delay are used to guarantee that the two pulse
trains arrive at the BS simultaneously. Meanwhile, two
polarization controllers and polarization beam splitters
are used to make the two beams’ polarization identical.
The output ports of the BS are led to two up-
conversion single photon detectors. The up-conversion
detector uses sum-frequency generation in a periodically
poled lithium niobate (PPLN) with a 1.94 µm pump
beam to convert the telecom-band photons to 860 nm,
where they are detected by a silicon single-photon detec-
tor. This scheme benefits from the high detection effi-
ciency and short dead time of the silicon detector, and
the long-wave pump technology [8] as well as the volume
bragg gratings (VBG) help to reduce the noise dramati-
cally [9]. The detectors used in our experiment both have
efficiencys larger than 14%, a dead time less than 80 ns,
and a dark count 500 Hz.
We utilize a time digital converter (TDC) to record the
detection signal. The TDC has a timing resolution of 160
ps and is synchronized with the pulse pattern generator
by sharing the same clock. The TDC will time tag and
memorize all the events and sent to a PC for analysis.
The final key rate formula is similar to the BB84 pro-
tocol [1],
K = N(1−HPA −HEC), (4)
where N stands for the length of sifted key and HEC =
f ·H(eb) accounts for the cost of error correction. Here,
denote eb to be the bit error rate, and f to be the error
correction efficiency. For simplicity, we use f = 1 in the
following postprocessing.
The privacy amplification cost is HPA = H(ep)× (1 +
1.98
√
s/N) where ep is the phase error rate and the sec-
ond factor accounts for finite key effects. Here s comes
from the security parameter 2−s, a typical value of which
is 100. To estimate the phase error rate, we set a proper
photon number threshold vth, which is a parameter to be
optimized. For an L-pulse signal containing more than
vth photons, we assume these photons as tagged and the
corresponding ep = 1/2, that is, Eve can get all infor-
mation about them. For a signal containing less than vth
photons, we can effectively bound the leaked information
by estimating its phase error rate (see Part II of Supple-
mental Material). Let esrc(vth) = Pr(n > vth) be the
probability of this, where n is the photon number of the
L-pulse signal. The phase error is calculated by
ep =
esrc
Q
+ (1− esrc
Q
)
1− (L−3L−1 )vth
4
+
m
M
2(1− mM )
, (5)
where Q is the gain of the experiment given by Nem/N .
Here Nem is the total number of blocks, N is the number
4of blocks after Bob’s post-selection, m is the total num-
ber of photon counts of one detector and M is the total
number of pulses.
The three additive terms in the phase error correspond
to the probability of more than vth photons, the proba-
bility of less than vth photons and the probability that
two or more photons simultaneously enter the same de-
tector at the same timestamp. Note that one factor 2 in
the denominator of (1−(L−3L−1 )vth)/4 is because the phase
error rate is 0 when the two clicks that Bob announces
are both from the signal or both from the reference, and
this probability is at least as large as the probability that
one such click comes from the signal and the other from
the reference. By choosing a proper value of vth, one can
minimize the cost of privacy amplification. The detailed
discussion is referred to the Supplemental Material.
The final key rate depends on the block length L.
Given the laser intensity of every pulse and the trans-
mission distance, there exists an optimal L for the key
rate. On Alice’s side, instead of setting a fixed L, we
modulate the CW laser to form a continuous sequential
pulse train, like the DPS QKD experiment [10, 11]. Dur-
ing the postprocessing step, we can choose an optimal L
by maximizing the final key rate, as shown in Fig. 3.
FIG. 3. The dependence of the key rate on the block size L
at various distances. For each distance, we repeat the experi-
ment by 10 times and take the standard deviations in 10 trials
as the error bar.
The experimental parameters with the optimal L are
listed in Table I.
The above analysis does not consider the dead time.
We discount its effect by post-selecting: immediately af-
ter one detector click, we effectively disable the other
detector within one dead time period by post-selecting
out this period. The exact treatment is referred to the
Supplemental Material.
In summary, we demonstrate a passive scheme to sub-
stitute the original RRDPS protocol and our system can
distill a secure key with a bit error rate of 28% in the lab.
TABLE I. List of optimal L, vth, eb, and eph for various dis-
tances.
d(km) µ optimal L vth eb eph
10 0.004 8192 57 0.275 0.00359
15 0.004 16384 99 0.271 0.00311
20 0.004 16384 100 0.283 0.00312
35 0.004 32768 179 0.276 0.00278
53 0.004 131072 625 0.312 0.00240
With our scheme, one can easily achieve a large number
L (say, L = 214) of pulse train in experiment. In the
original scheme, the pulse train length L needs to op-
timized before the experiment, which requires a precise
calibration of the system. In our scheme, on the other
hand, the parameter L can be decided during postpro-
cessing step, which has an advantage in the case with
large environment fluctuations.
The inherent error can be removed by a post-selecting
technique [12] combined with the recently developed
discrete-phase-randomization scheme for the coherent
states [13]. In principle, with certain modifications, such
technique can be used in our scheme. This is an interest-
ing prospective research project. Meanwhile, the inher-
ent error can be removed by using phase-locked coherent
state. Note that if Alice sends a strong laser pulse to
Bob as reference and Bob directly uses it as for inter-
ference, Eve may implement a man-in-the-middle attack.
One solution to remove this potential threat is to utilize
frequency comb based frequency distribution technology
[14].
In future, a field test of the passive RRDPS scheme
with two independent lasers can be realized by the tech-
nology developed in a recent QKD experiment [15]. With
low-jitter and high-efficiency single photon detectors [16],
a much higher secure key rate with a 10 GHz clock rate
system [10] can be achieved.
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